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this trade-off.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/localincomeredis1237brue
Local Income Redistribution: A Club-Theoretic Analysis
by
Jan K. Brueckner
1 . Introduction
The standard view in public finance is that income redistribution
is best carried out at the national level. Proponents of this view
(see Oates (1972), for example) claim that nothing is gained by de-
centralizing the redistributive function, and that consumer mobility
will in any case subvert local redistribution as the rich flee (and the
poor flood into) jurisdictions attempting it. In a recent revival of
interest in the redistribution issue, Pauly (1973) and Brown and Oates
(1985) challenged the orthodox view by arguing that redistribution deci-
sions should be decentralized when consumer altruism has limited spatial
scope (with the rich caring only about the welfare of the poor in their
own community).
Rather than extending recent developments, the present paper returns
to the standard framework and explores an issue that was not adequately
treated in the earlier literature: the inefficiency of local redistribu-
tion. The paper's key assumption is that intercommunity transfers are
not possible, perhaps as a result of the weakness of the central govern-
ment. This assumption means that income redistribution, if it is to
occur, must proceed entirely on the local Level. The analysis in the
paper is devoted to characterizing optimal redistribution in the re-
sulting second-best framework. Optimality is judged on the basis of a
standard social welfare function (the interdependent-utilities assump-
tion of recent work is dropped).
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Analysis of local redistribution is interesting for several reasons.
First, the problem is conceptually intriguing since it involves a trade-
off between equity and efficiency (this is discussed further below).
Second, even though local redistribution is infeasible in a frictionless
world (making the analysis purely academic), actual frictions leave con-
siderable room for such policies. The wide variation in property tax
liabilities within a typical community, for example, shows that redis-
tribution via unequal sharing of local public good costs is commonplace
in today's economy and of appreciable magnitude. This suggests that an
understanding of the economics of local redistribution could be valuable
in today's setting. The analysis may also provide a good picture of the
redistribution options open to pre-modern economies, where central-
government weakness ruled out a national redistribution policy and
2
restricted mobility made local redistribution feasible.
The paper's analytical framework is drawn from the theory of clubs.
In the standard club model, as originally proposed by Buchanan (1965)
and refined by Berglas (1976b) and Berglas and Pines (1981), the optimal
club (or community) structure does not depend on the nature of
redistribution. Homogeneous clubs are formed to promote efficiency in
public consumption while society's equity goals are met by appropriate
transfers between clubs. Equity and efficiency considerations are, by
contrast, no longer separable when interclub transfers are ruled out, as
in the present analysis. Since income redistribution now requires that
different types of individuals be mixed in heterogeneous clubs, the
pursuit of equity entails an efficiency loss. This loss arises because
public consumption in mixed clubs cannot be tailored to suit individual
preferences.
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The analysis in the paper formalizes this equity-efficiency trade-
off and shows that if society has a strong taste for redistrihution, the
efficiency loss from mixed cluhs will he worth hearing. Otherwise, a
homogeneous-club structure hased on the original distribution of income
mav be optimal. The paper also explores the effect of various parameter
changes on the optimal club structure. In addition to the contributions
mentioned above, the analysis complements the work of Berglas (1976a,
1984), who showed that mixed clubs can be optimal for reasons unrelated
3
to income redistribution.
2. Redistribution with Interclub Transfers
It is useful to begin by reviewing the income redistribution problem
when interclub transfers are allowed. For simplicity, assume that there
are two types of individuals in the economy, a and b. Let 9 denote the
proportion of the total population N composed of type-a individuals
(the economy has 9N a-types (1-0)N b-tvpes). Let the exogenous incomes
for the two tvpes be T and I,
,
and let U(x
,
z) and V(x, ,z) denote theira a b
well-behaved utility functions, with x and x, giving the consumption
a b
levels of a composite private good x and z denoting consumption of a
congested public good. C(z,n) denotes the cost in terms of x of
4
providing a public consumption level z to a club of n people. Costs
are increasing and convex in z (C > 0, C > 0) and the assumption that
z zz —
the public good is congested further implies that C > 0. An additional
assumption is that for any z > 0, average cost C(z,n)/n is a U-shaped
function of n (this guarantees the existence of a positive and finite
optimal club size).
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The economy's utility-possibi Lity frontier is derived under the
requirement of horizontal equity (identical utilities for identical
people), with the utility level of the a-types maximized subject to the
requirement that the b-types achieve a given utility and that the
relevant resource constraint is satisfied. While the economy's resource
constraint depends on how the population is organized into clubs,
Berglas and Pines (1981) prove that any organization involving mixed
clubs is dominated by one with homogeneous clubs. With homogeneous
clubs, the resource constraint becomes
9NI + (l-e)NI. = 9Nx + (6N/n )C(z ,n )
a b a a a a
+ (l-9)Nx
b
+ ((l-6)N/n
b
)C(z
b
,n
b ), (1)
where n and n. denote the populations of the type a and type b clubs
a b
and z and z, denote their public good levels. The LHS of (1) is total
a b
income in the economy, while the terms on the RHS involving x and
x, add up to total x consumption. The remaining terms give the total
b
cost of public good provision in all of the economy's clubs. As writ-
ten, (1) reflects the standard practice of ignoring the integer problem.
The difficulty is that while the number of clubs is necessarilv an
integer, the expressions 9N/n and (l-9)N/n_
,
which give the number of
a b
clubs of each type in (1), need not be integer-valued. As long as the
group populations are large relative to the optimal club sizes, this
problem is inconsequential.
The utility frontier with interclub transfers (hereafter the
"homogeneous-club" frontier) is generated by maximizing U(x ,z ) subiect
a a
to (1) and the constraint V(x, ,z, ) = v for all feasible values of v.
b b
-5-
The necessary conditions for the type-a clubs are the Samueison condition
n U /U = Ca and C = C /n , which states that n is chosen to minimize
a z x z n a a
per capita public good cost (the a-superscript indicates that C is
evaluated at (z ,n )). Analogous conditions hold for the type-b clubs,
a a
The curve GC in Figure 1 represents the homogeneous-club
frontier. Of special interest is the "no-redistribution" point,
denoted H, which is characterized by the absence of interclub trans-
fers. At this point, each club consumes resources exactly equal to
the exogenous income of its members, or
Vk = W + C(zk' nk ) ' k = a,b * (2)
Letting v* and u* denote the utilities associated with the no-
redistribution point, it is easily seen that for v > v*, redistribu-
tion must flow toward the b-types, while for v < v* , redistribution
must flow toward the a-types. In other words,
Vb < Vb + c(vV as v > v*' (3)
with the reverse inequality holding for the a-types.
The final ingredient in the choice problem is a social welfare
function, which under the horizontal equity requirement can be written
W(u,v). As usual, the social welfare maximum corresponds to a point
of tangency between the utility frontier and an indifference curve of
W, as shown in Figure 1. The direction of redistribution depends on
the properties of W, on the features of the individual utility
functions and the public good cost function, and on the incomes and
relative sizes of the groups.
\u
u*
-
u
v' v*
Figure 1.
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3. The Mixed-Club I'tilitv Frontier
When interciub transfers are ruled out, all points on the homoge-
neous-club frontier other than the no-redistribution point H become
inadmissible. A given group's utility can be raised above its level at
point H only through redistribution within a mixed club. To charac-
terize the resulting opportunity locus, it is convenient to first derive
the mixed-club utility frontier.
Under the requirement of horizontal equity, admissible mixed-club
configurations must afford identical utilities to individuals of a given
type. While configurations of non-identical clubs need not violate this
principle, it will become clear below that such arrangements are domi-
nated by a configuration of identical clubs where types a and b are
mixed in the same proportion as in the general population. Letting
n denote the population of a representative mixed club and z denote its
Q
public good level, the club resource constraint is
9nl + (l-e)nl. = 9nx + (l-6)nxt + C(z,n). (4)
a n a b
Note that the club is composed of 9n a-types and (1-9 )n b-types
,
reflecting their proportions in the population. To derive the mixed-
club utility frontier, U(x ,z) is again maximized subject to (4) and
a
V(x ,z) = v for all feasible values of v. Additional restrictions on
b
the problem are the nonnegativity constraints x > and x, > 0, which
a — b —
were superfluous in the earlier analysis. To see why these constraints
are needed in the mixed-club problem, note that the highest feasible
value of v in the problem results from setting x = in (4) and choos-
a
ing x and z to maximize V(x ,z)(let x, and z, denote the maximizing
b b b b
values and v V
^ 5Cb' zu))- Since the nonnegativity constraint
-7-
on x will be binding when v is at or near this maximum, it cannot be
a
ignored (a parallel argument applies to the constraint x, > 0).
b —
When x and x, are both positive, the necessary conditions for a
a b
mixed-club optimum include the Samuelson condition 9nU /U + (1-9 )nV /V
z x z x
= C and the per-capita cost-minimization condition C = C/n. While
z n
the latter condition still holds when x or x, is zero, the Samuelson
a b
condition is replaced when x = by
a
6nU (1-9 )nV
+ Tr
E
= C
,
(5)
U + v V zX X
where u > is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
x > 0. Eq. (5) shows that the sum of the marginal rates of substitu-
a —
tion exceeds C when the nonnegativity constraint on x is binding, a
z a
9 10
conclusion which also holds when the constraint x, > is binding.
b —
For later reference, it will be useful to establish the properties
of the mixed-club frontier in the transferable-utility case, where the
utility functions are given by x + t(z) and x, + s(z). First, it is
a b
easy to see that the frontier is linear in this case over the range
where x and x, are positive. This follows because in general, the
a b
slope of the frontier when x, > is given by
b
i-e ux
+ v
X
where X is the multiplier associated with the type-b utility constraint,
When x > (so that u = 0) and utiLity is transferable, the slope
a
expression (6) becomes -(1-6 )/9, establishing linearity. A further
-8-
implication of (6) is that the frontier's absolute slope exceeds (l-9)/9
when the nonnegativity constraint on x is binding, with the curve
becoming vertical as the lower endpoint is reached (manipulation of (5)
shows that strict concavity in fact holds over this range). By symmetry,
the frontier flattens over the range where x, = 0, becoming horizontal
b
at its upper endpoint (concavity again holds).
Several additional properties of the mixed-club frontier can be
established. First, since mixed clubs are inefficient, the mixed-club
frontier must lie below the homogeneous-club frontier. Formally, this
can be seen by noting that the constraint (4) is equivalent to the
constraint (1) together with the side conditions z = z, and n = n, .
a b a b
Since the mixed-club optimization problem thus has a smaller oppor-
tunity set, it follows that for a given v, the maximal value of u is
no larger than in the homogeneous-club problem. In the normal case
where optimal homogeneous clubs are different across types, u will be
strictly lower in the mixed-club problem.
An additional observation is that since the benefits of public con-
sumption are always available in a mixed club regardless of the extent
of redistribution, each group's minimum utility level on the mixed-club
frontier exceeds its minimum utility level on the homogeneous-club
frontier. In particular, the minimum type-a utility u. = U(0,z ) exceeds
the utility U(0,0) at the lower endpoint G' of the homogeneous-club
frontier (the latter utility results from complete expropriation of
the a's). Similarly, v = V(0,z ) > V(0,0) (z and z, are defined ana-
— a a b
logously )
.
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A further question concerns the relation between the highest
feasible mixed-club utilities (v and u) and the utilities at point
H (v* and u* ) . The answer is that at least one of the inequalities
v > v* and u > u* must hold. This fact is established by focusing on
the b's and showing that while v > v* must hold if I, < I
,
the rela-
b — a
tionship is ambiguous otherwise. To see the first claim, note that
when I, < I holds, total club income on the LHS of (4) exceeds or
b — a
equals income in a homogeneous type-b club (nl,). Since type-b expen-
b
diture is higher in a homogeneous club for given x,
,
z, and n (nx, + C
b b
versus (l-9)nx. + C (recall x = 0)), it follows that the homogeneous-
b a
club constraint lies strictly below the mixed-club constraint, implying
v > v*. If I > I holds instead, then a repetition of the preceding
b a
argument gives u > u*. However, since mixed-club income is now lower
than nl,
,
v and v* cannot be compared in general (instead of domi-
b
nating the homogeneous-club constraint, (4) with x =0 now intersects
a
it). It is worth noting, however, that v > v* will still hold pro-
vided an additional requirement is satisfied. This can he seen by
rewriting (4) with x = as
a
(nl -C(z,n))
+ nl. = nx, + C(z,n). (7)1-9 b b
If the a's can afford to operate an optimal type-b club, so that
* * *
n, I - C(z,,n,) > 0, then it follows that such a club is also afford-
b a b b
able under (7), implying v > v*. Summarizing the above discussion,
Figure 1 shows the location of the mixed-club frontier, denoted gg '
.
The case where v > v* and u > u* both hold is illustrated.
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Consider next the location of the no-redistribution point on the
frontier, which satisfies I = x + C/n, k = a,b (each individual's
income exact lv covers his x consumption plus his share of public good
costs). It is easily seen that this point (denoted h in Figure 1) lies
to the southwest of H (its coordinates are v' and u'). Unlike in the
homogeneous-club problem, location relative to the no-redistribution
point is not a perfect indicator of resource flows. In other words, in
contrast to (3), it is not necessarily true that I, . x, + C(z,n)/n as
b < b
v
s
v' (a v above v' need not imply consumption in excess of income).
It is easy to show, however, that the value of a group's consumption
must exceed its income when utility exceeds the point-H level. To see
this, suppose there exist points on the mixed-club frontier where u
exceeds u*. Since u* is the highest utility achievable subject to the
constraint I = x + C(z,n)/n, a consumption bundle yielding u > u* must
a a
satisfy I < x + C/n (which in turn implies I. > x, + C/n). The
a a b b
reverse statements hold at points with v > v*. Since this type of argu-
ment cannot be made when u < u* and v < v* , the relationship between
12
income and the value of consumption in this range is ambiguous.
4. Restribution Without Intercluh Transfer s
With the above background, it is possible to consider the full
income redistribution problem in the absence of interclub transfers.
Feasible outcomes consist of all points on the mixed-club frontier
together with the single point on the homogeneous club frontier where
no transfers occur—the no-redistribution point H. Referring to Figure
1, it is clear that since H Pareto-dominates all points to the south
-11-
and west on the mixed-club frontier, such points are not candidates for
the optimum. As a result, the opportunity locus for the probiem con-
sists of H together with the portions of the mixed-club frontier
satisfying u > u* and v > v*, as shown in Figure 2 (the case where u
and v both exceed the point-H utilities is again illustrated).
Figure 2 shows that the location of the optimum depends on the shape
of the social welfare function's indifference curves. Point H is opti-
mal for an indifference map containing the solid curve, while point f
(involving redistribution in favor of the a's) is optimal when the
indifference map includes the dotted curve. It is clear that for
redistribution to be optimal in the situation shown in Figure 2, W's
indifference curves must either be steep or relatively flat, indicating
that social preferences place a heavy weight on one group's welfare.
The intuitive reason for this outcome is that when the a's and the b's
are mixed to achieve redistribution, an efficiency loss results since
public consumption can no longer be tailored to suit individual tastes.
For society to tolerate this loss, the social welfare function must
exhibit a strong preference for redistribution, heavily favoring one
group.
To make this notion more precise, suppose that the social welfare
function can be written W(u,v,a), where a is a weighting parameter lying
in the interval [a, a]. Assume that W > and W < 0, so that an
— ua va
increase in a shifts preferences in the a's favor. Under these assump-
tions, the slope expression W /W is a decreasing function of a, indi-
v u
eating that indifference curves become flatter as a increases. The
\
\
V*
Figure 2.
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curves are assumed to be horizontal (W = 0) when a = a and vertical
v
(W = 0) when a = a. Given these assumptions, the following result can
u —
be established:
Proposition 1: Suppose that point H is the unique optimum
for q = ct . Then there exist positive numbers 5 and £ such
that H is optimal for all a in the interval [a - e, a +6]
while redistribution is optimal for all ct lying outside this
interval .
To prove this proposition, first consider the case where v > v* and
u > u*. Let v (a ) and u.(ct) denote the values of v and u which maximize
W(u,v,ct) along the upper arm of the opportunity locus (extended to
include the lower endpoint). Let F (a) = W(u (a ) ,v (a) ,a ) - W(u*,v*,a)
denote the utility differential between the upper arm and point H.
Since H is the unique optimum when a = a, it follows that F (a) < 0.
Furthermore, since W's indifference curves are horizontal when a = a and
since u > u* , the inequality F (a ) > holds. Application of the envelope
theorem yields in addition F,'(a) = W (u
,
(a ) ,v (ot ) ,a ) - W (u*,v*,a) > 0,
1 all a
where the inequality follows because u (ot)
_> u* and v (a) < v* while
W > and W < 0. Together, the above facts imply that there exists
ua va
J
a 5 > such that point H is optimal (F (a)
_< 0) for a < a < a + 5
while redistribution in favor of the a's is optimal (F (a) > 0) for
- 13
a +5 < ct < a . Reversing this argument for the lower arm of the oppor-
tunity locus proves that there exits an e > such that point H is
optimal for a - e C a < a while redistribution in favor of the b's
is preferred for a < a < a - e. Finally note that if u < u* , then
redistribution in favor of the a's is never preferred and <S = ct - a
-13-
(v < v* similarly implies e = a - a_) . It should be realized thai
although Figure 2 may suggest the contrary, it is conceivable that
under certain conditions point H is never optimal for any value of a.
As a result, the assumption that a exists is not inconsequential.
While Proposition 1 shows that a discrete change in ct is reauired
to move the optimum away from the no-redistribution point, Figure 1
shows that any change in a , no matter how small, will achieve this
outcome when interclub transfers are allowed. The reason, of course,
is that when such transfers are possible, there Is no efficiencv loss
from redistribution. As a result, the slightest change in social
preferences is sufficient to bring it about.
It is interesting to consider a special case where the optimum can
be determined directly. First, suppose that the social welfare func-
tion assumes the Benthamite form 9Nu + (1-8 )Nv. Assume in addition
that utility is transferable, as discussed above. Since W's indifference
curves are linear with slope -(1-6 )/9 while the mixed-club frontier con-
sists of an intermediate linear segment with this same slope together
with concave extremities, it follows immediately that point H is optimal.
Redistribution, of course, can be made optimal in this example bv alter-
ing W's welfare weights in favor of one group.
Changes in the parameters 1,1,, and 9 can alter the solution to
a b
the welfare maximization problem. While the effect of an increase in
14
either I or I is not clearcut, the impact of a change in the
distribution of income that leaves total income unchanged is straight-
forward. The mixed-club utility frontier is unaffected bv such a change
since 91 + (1-9)1 is constant. However, point H moves uphill along
a b
-14-
the homogeneous-club frontier (which itself remains fixed) as I rises
a
and 1 falls (moving downhill in the reverse case). Inspection of
b
Figure 2 shows that such a movement will eventually make H preferred
to f when f is initially optimal. More generally, Figure 1 shows that
suitable adjustment of the income distribution can make point H
Pareto-superior to any point on the mixed-club frontier. These obser-
vations suggest
Proposition 2: For any social welfare function, redistribution
favoring a given group will become suboptimal as th
e
distribution of income shifts in its favor (and total income
remains fixed) .
The reason for this result is that as the original income distribution
becomes more eauitable from the perspective of a given W, society will
be less inclined to tolerate the efficiency loss of mixed-club
redistribution. In contrast to Proposition 2, Figure 1 shows that the
social optimum is insensitive to the distribution of income when inter-
club transfers are allowed. Resource flows, however, are affected,
with transfers to (away from) a given group shrinking (growing) as the
income distribution shifts in its favor.
The first step in analyzing the effect of a change in the type-a
proportion 9 is to deduce the impact on the opportunity locus. First,
the no-redistribution point is unaffected. The impact on the mixed-club
frontier is found by applying the envelope theorem and differentiating
the Lagrangean expression for the mixed-club problem. This yields
f!- Y n[(Vxa ) -<I b-x>l. (8)
•15-
where y is the positive multiplier associated with the resource
constraint (4). When I - x < C/n holds, I. - x, > C/n and 3u/9B from
a a b b
(6) is negative. In other words, if resources are being transferred
from the b's to the a's (yielding type-a consumption in excess of
income), then the a's are hurt by an increase in 9, which shrinks the
relative size of the expropriated group. Recalling from section 3 that
I < x + C/n holds at points on the mixed-club frontier where u > u*
,
a a
it follows that the upper arm of the opportunity locus shifts downward
as 9 increases. The reverse argument shows that the lower arm shifts
upward as 9 increases. These movements are in fact part of an overall
rotation of the mixed-club frontier in response to the higher 9 (the
axis is the no-redistribution point h in Figure 1). Recalling that the
relation between I and x + C/n may be perverse near the redistribution
a a
point, the rotation near that point may be opposite to that occurring at
the extremes of the frontier.
A change in 9 will typically shift the indifference map of the social
welfare function, with a higher 9 flattening the indifference curves
(this follows from differentiating W /W with respect to 9 under the
v u
assumptions W n > 0, W _ < 0). Since both the indifference curves and
u9 vo
the arms of the opportunity locus rotate as 9 increases, the impact on
the optimum is unclear. If, however, the degree of rotation is similar
and if no redistribution is initially optimal, it is likely that this
outcome remains optimal as 9 increases. This is true, for example, in
the special case considered above, where no redistribution is optimal
regardless of the value of 9.
-16-
In the one admissible case where indifference curves do not depend
on 9 , a strong statement can be made:
Proposition 3: Suppose u* * v* and that v > v* and u > u*
hold for all 8. Then if the social welfare function is
Rawlsian, redistribution is optimal at either high or low
values of 8 .
This claim is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the rotating
opportunity locus together with the right-angled indifference curves
of the Rawlsian welfare function. While point H is initially optimal,
the redistribution point m is optimal following the increase in 8.
Note that if H had been located at the corner of an indifference curve
(u* = v*), then redistribution would never be optimal for any 8. Note
also that if H had been located below instead of above the 45° line, a
decline in 8 (yielding a clockwise rotation of the upper and lower arms)
would have been required to make redistribution optimal.
When interclub redistribution is allowed, the story is somewhat
different. A calculation analogous to (6) shows that the homogeneous-
club frontier rotates counterclockwise around the no-redistribution
point when 8 increases. As in the earlier discussion, this movement
combined with the changing slope of W's indifference curves yields an
ambiguous impact on the location of the optimum in the general case.
In the Rawlsian case, however, inspection of Figure 1 shows that the
direction of redistribution is unaffected by an increase in 9 , in
contrast to Proposition 3.
While Proposition 3 applies to an extreme case, it seems safe to
make the generalization that redistribution will be optimal for high
H <»
Figure 3.
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or low values of 9 when the social welfare function exhibits strong
(though not necessarily infinite) aversion to inequality. In this
case, indifference curves will be nearly right-angled, and the
rotation accompanying an increase in 9 will be slight. To gain an
intuitive understanding of the role played by aversion to inequality,
note first since an increase in 9 enlarges the a-group relative to the
b-group, the type-b utility can be raised above v* with a smaller
sacrifice from each type-a individual (the lower arm of the oppor-
tunity locus shifts up). For this reduced efficiency loss to elicit
redistribution in the b's favor, the fact that there are now fewer b's
and more a's must have little impact on welfare judgments. This will
only be the case under social welfare functions with a strong aversion
to inequality, where the utility differential between the groups
carries more weight than their relative sizes.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed optimal income redistribution in a club
model where prohibition of interclub transfers induces a trade-off
between equity and efficiency. A main lesson of the analysis is that
if society's equity standards are unbalanced, heavily favoring one
group, then the efficiency loss from mixed-club redistribution will
be worth bearing.
As discussed in the introduction, the model's planning solutions
are directly relevant only in the special case of a pre-modern economy,
where the central government is weak (precluding intercommunity transfers)
-18-
and mobility costs are high (allowing some scope for local redistribu-
tion). The analysis, however, has contemporary policy implications.
In particular, the discussion shows that given the redistributive power
of modern central governments, no redistribution whatsoever should occur
at the local level, in contrast to current practice. Ideally, consumers
should be segregated into homogeneous communities where public spending
and individual preferences are perfectly matched, with equity goals
achieved via intercommunity transfers. While it is perhaps excessive
to expect implementation of this arrangement, the analysis clearly
identifies it as ideal.
-19-
Footnot es
For a more recent summary of this position, see Wildasin (1985).
2
Brown and Oates (1985) point out that disparity among local re-
distribution policies under the British Poor Laws in the 1600's led to
considerable illegal migration of the poor (along with subsequent
deportment to their original jurisdictions). This suggests that not
all premodern societies were characterized by low mobility.
3
Berglas ' 1976a paper showed that mixed clubs will be desirable
when there is complementarity between groups in production. His 1984
paper showed that with multiple public services, there may again be
gains from mixing individuals.
4
For simplicity, it is assumed that the rate-of-use of the public
facility is not a choice variable of the consumer, in contrast to the
models of Berglas and Pines (1981) and Berglas (1984).
Although their argument applied to a model where the rate-of-use
of the public facility is variable, the proof can be adapted to the
present model.
In this case, the "extra" individuals (those filling the
fractional club) can be dispersed among a large number of clubs,
yielding a solution virtually indistinguishable from one where the
population divides perfectly into an integer number of clubs. See
Scotchmer (1985) for an analysis of decentralization of optimal club
structures when the integer problem is not ignored.
The slope 3u/3v of the frontier equals -X, where X is the positive
Lagrange multiplier associated with the type-b utility constraint.
While the curvature of the frontier is indeterminate in general, it is
shown as convex.
Q
The integer problem is again ignored. The relationship between
this formulation and that of Berglas (1976a) should also be noted. The
income term on the right of (4) is replaced in Berglas by the club's
output of the private good F(9n, ( 1-9 )n) , which depends on inputs of
both types of labor. While Berglas chooses 9 optimally, initially
ignoring the overall population constraint, such an exercise is
inappropriate in the present problem since the linearity of (4) in 9
yields corner solutions.
9
When x^ = 0, (5) is replaced by the condition
9nU (1-9 )nV
U V u (1-9 )U ; VXX X
where n is the multiplier asspciated with the constraint x^
_> 0.
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The behavior of x^ and z over the range where x
a
= can be
analyzed by eliminating Xl in V using (4). Differentiation then shows
that dV/dz has the sign of ( 1-6 )nV
z
/V"
x
- C
z
,
which is negative by (5)
when u is finite. This establishes that as v increases over the range
where xa = 0, z must be Jfalling_and x. rising. When the consumption
levels reach the values xb and z b where the condition (l-8)nV2 /Vx - C z
holds, v will have achieved its maximum value v ((5) shows that u must
be infinite at this point). Finally, note that as v rises and z declines
over the range where xa = 0, u = U(0,z) falls. By symmetry, the reverse
of the above discussion applies when x* = 0.
The reason is that for each group, both allocations lie on the
same constraint (recall (2)) while the mixed-club allocation satisfies
a condition (the mixed-club Samuelson condition) different from the
one which guarantees maximum utility subject to that constraint (the
homogeneous-club Samuelson condition). As a result, utilities at point
h are lower for both groups.
12
Some insight into this ambiguity can be gained by considering
the derivative d(x. + C(z ,n)/n)/dv. A positive value for this deriva-
tive, for example, would indicate that type-b consumption exceeds
income for all v > v'. Inverting the utility constraint to write x<
as Xu(z,v), with 3xv/3z = ~V
Z
/V and 3xu/3z = 1 /V , the above deriva-
tive equals
c v . , U V/_z zs 3z_ 1_ m f_z z* _3_z 1_
n V 3v V V U V ' 3v V
X X XX X
(the eauality follows from the Samuelson condition). Since the dif-
ference between the MRS's can have either sign and since the 3z/3v is
also ambiguous (it depends on how the MRS's change when x varies
holding z fixed), the sign of the above expression is indeterminate.
In particular, it is possible for the derivative to be negative at the
no-redistribution point, implying that type-b consumption initially
falls below income as v rises above v'. The previous argument shows
that any such effect must have been reversed by the time v reaches v*.
13
Note that since the lower arm utility differential F (a)
(defined analogously to F (a ) ) starts out negative at a and is
decreasing in a, redistribution in favor of the b's cannot he optimal
for a > a.
14
When Ia increases, for example, the no-redistribution point moves
straight upward and the mixed-club frontier also shifts up. The impact
on the optimum is not determinate.
-21-
It should be noted that the above rotation ultimately leads to a
horizontal frontier as 9 reaches unity (its height is u*). Similarly,
a vertical frontier at v* results when 9 falls to zero.
1 6
At this point, the undesirability of mixed-club structures with
non-identical clubs can be demonstrated. The procedure is to ask
whether the utility outcomes along the upper arm of the opportunity
locus can be improved upon by shifting to a non-identical club structure
while maintaining horizontal equity (the same argument applies to the
lower arm). First, since 8u/39 is negative on the upper arm of the
locus, it follows that decreasing the type-a proportion in a club below
the population proportion raises type-a utility (club population is
adjusted optimally and type-b utility is held fixed). While creating
such clubs is desirable, they require the existence of other clubs with
type-a proportions above 9. Since these clubs (whose populations are
again chosen optimally) yield a lower type-a utility than the original
club, the requirement of horizontal equity is violated. By suitably
adjusting club populations as the proportions diverge from 9, equality
of type-a utilities conceivable could be preserved. However, since the
utility of type-a's in an optimal-size club where their proportion is
high is lower than in the original club, the same conclusion must hold
when the former club's population is not optimal. It follows that if
horizontal equity can be preserved as clubs become dissimilar, the
type-a utility must fall. While the above argument implicitly assumes
that type-a utility remains above u* (so that u is decreasing in the
type-a proportion), if club reorganization drives u below u* in some
club and horizontal equity is preserved, the outcome is clearly inferior
to the original mixed-club structure.
Since indifference curves show some curvature in this case, the
location of H relative to the 45° line is not an issue. Regardless of
H's location, redistribution will be optimal for both high and low values
of 9 (this can be seen from a diagram like Figure 3).
-22-
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